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Summary in relation to three of the Committee’s Questions 
Have the UK’s economic conditions materially changed since the Eddington Transport Study, 
and if so, does this affect the relationship between transport spending and UK economic 
growth? 
The Eddington analysis showed that the attempt to reduce congestion by infrastructure 
improvements, but without road pricing, would be associated with deteriorating 
conditions not improving ones, due to the scale of traffic growth expected.  
Apart from the immediate effects of the recession itself, there are some important 
revisions that need to be made to the Eddingon analysis. These are (a) traffic growth 
trends, and their relationship with income growth, seem to be quite different from 
those which have underpinned most transport appraisals, and this substantially 
predates the recession; (b) the treatment of indirect tax in appraisals used in the period 
2003-2009 (including implicitly by Eddington) has quite rightly been changed; (c) 
there is now much evidence on a wider set of transport alternatives, not only 
traditional infrastructure improvements. Taken together, there are in some ways more 
favourable possibilities in spite of financial stringency, and there are ways of getting 
better value for money even in the context of cuts.  
What type of transport spending should be prioritised, in the context of an overall spending 
reduction, in order best to support regional and national economic growth? 
By far the best value for money is currently coming from spending on ‘smarter 
choices’ (travel planning, car-reduction policies, telecommunications as alternatives to 
some travel, etc), local safety schemes, cycling schemes, and the best of local bus and 
some rail quality and reliability enhancements. There are also unrealised opportunities 
for high benefit new light rail systems in some places. Traditional road capacity 
schemes are now giving much lower estimated value for money.  
Intention is not the same as outcome, and some transport interventions may have a 
perverse effect on economic efficiency, due to traffic trends where economic costs are 
not directly charged, and to the ‘two-way road’ problem.  
How should the balance between capital and revenue be altered? 
The problem is that the cheap, swift, high value for money, popular policies are often 
classified as ‘revenue’ (even when they save capital spending) whereas many of the 
expensive, slow, lower value for money, controversial projects are classified as 
‘capital’ (even if they involve more revenue spending in the long run). This distorts 
decision-making. It is essential to have flexibility to move between capital and 
revenue, the same funding stringency applied to both, and/or a greater ingenuity in 
accepting re-classification.  
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1. The Eddington Report: reminding ourselves what the analysis really showed 
As always with long and complex reports, the results can be mis-remembered. For a full picture it is 
necessary not only to look at its summary, but also the technical work, notably in the main report
1
, its 
important Volume 3
2
, and a technical annex with modelling results provided by the Department for 
Transport
3
.  
It is true that the Eddington Report focussed on reducing congestion in urban areas, key inter-
urban corridors, and key international gateways. However, this one sentence summary misses 
some very important parts of the underlying analysis. These showed that the attempt to meet 
these objectives by expanding infrastructure investment but without road pricing would not in 
fact lead to an improvement in congestion, but steadily worsening travel conditions. It ‘made 
things worse more slowly’ rather than ‘making things better’. 
Now that road pricing is off the political agenda, at least for a while (and perhaps ever?), this 
message becomes very salient. There is an argument about whether the effects of transport on 
the economy are in addition to the conventional assessed transport benefits especially time 
savings, or simply a re-expression of them, but in any case it is clear that if there are weak 
transport benefits, there is little driving source of wider economic benefits. People do not 
make investment and increase employment because they are convinced that things could be 
even worse, but because they see evidence that things will get better. 
The evidence for such worsening conditions is seen in the DfT model results in the Annex.  
Table 1: DfT Modelling Results Showing Congestion Getting Worse, in the absence of 
road pricing, even with a very large road building programme 
  
                                                 
1
 Eddington R (2006) 'Transport's role in sustaining UK's Productivity and Competitiveness: The Case for 
Action'. Department for Transport, London  
2
 Volume 3 - Meeting the challenge: prioritising the most effective policies 
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20070129122531/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/39E/F8/eddingtonreview_vol3.0_011206.pdf 
3
 Department for Transport (2006) Transport Demand to 2025 and the Economic Case for Road Pricing and 
Investment , DfT London December 
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In the last row there is the preferred measure of the severity of congestion. It is seen that with 
road pricing (and with the substantially reduced road programme that would then be implied) 
there is a significant net improvement in the level of congestion, measured as a 37% fall in 
the average delay: most of this effect is due to the pricing itself. However, in the without road 
pricing case, even with the very much larger road construction programme that would then, 
under the assumptions, be warranted, congestion actually gets worse, giving an increase of 
28% in average delay.  
This reinforces a widely observed phenomenon, namely that most or all road proposals, 
appraised assuming no road pricing, provide their benefits in the form of ‘slowing down the 
pace at which congestion gets worse’, as measured not against an observable starting point, or 
any actual experience of road user, but against a 60 year forecast sometimes called the ‘do-
nothing’ option. Thus the appraisal will interpret this difference between the two forecasts as 
a benefit, but the road user will experience a progressive worsening of travel conditions. It is 
not sensible to expect that this will lead to wider economic benefits, except in a peculiarly 
negative sense. 
2. Revising and updating the Eddington analysis 
Having made this caveat, a good summary of the key results of the Eddington Report, 
expressed in terms of Benefit-Cost Ratios (BCRs), is provided by Dodgson (2009)
4
 as shown 
in Table 2.  
Table 2 Dodgson’s (2009) Summary of Eddington Results 
 
At face value the results seemed to suggest that walking and cycling schemes gave the best 
value for money, then highway schemes, then public transport schemes. Policies such as 
smarter choices were not included as there was insufficient data available (or at least, known 
to the Eddington team) at that time.  
                                                 
4
 Dodgson J (2009) Rates of return on public spending on transport, RAC Foundation, London                         
http://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloadables/rates%20of%20return%20-
%20dodgson%20-%20190609%20-%20report.pdf 
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The  most important departures from the Eddington assumptions that I would now suggest 
relate to (a) new interpretations of changing trends that were already happening, especially in 
relation to trends in traffic growth; (b) new appraisal rules adopted by the DfT especially in 
relation to indirect tax; and (c) the need for closer attention to those expenditures which 
appeared to score well, but for which the report had little data. All of these have a substantial 
effect on the Eddington conclusions.  
(a) Traffic growth. 
The Eddington work followed the then DfT official assumptions about long term traffic 
growth which in some respects now seem implausible. This especially relates to a flattening 
(and some signs of reduction) in car use preceding the recession, perhaps going back as far as 
the early 1990s when there was an important shift, not noticed at the time, in the relationship 
between traffic growth and economic growth. Sometimes called ‘decoupling’, this meant that 
increasing incomes were associated with a declining, less than proportional growth in traffic, 
rather than the increasing, more than proportional relationship which had applied previously.  
The consequence of the then Eddington assumptions (which are thought still to be the view of 
DfT officials) was that the long term trend in congestion was inexorably expected to be 
getting worse, even if an unaffordably large and politically untenable road construction 
programme were initiated. Only road pricing would bring about an actual improvement, but 
this itself was also deemed politically unacceptable. If these trends are softer, or go into 
reverse, then it is possible to make improvements in transport efficiency with less drastic and 
divisive policies, which in turn gives a more optimistic prospect. The research is not yet 
definitive, but recent discussions among researchers show this interpretation must be taken 
seriously, not dismissed out of hand. 
All the infrastructure schemes appraised in the last two decades have been on the basis of 
assumptions about future traffic using, or based on, Department for Transport forecasts. 
These have typically been based on high and continuing rates of growth of car use, which 
increases expected future congestion and hence raises the estimated benefits of expanding 
road infrastructure, as well as putting downward pressure on the demand for non-car 
transport. However, since 1989 the actual growth in traffic has been very much less than 
forecast, and currently is actually reducing. (The latest year of data will reflect recessionary 
pressures, but the change in trend clearly started well before that). Figure 1 shows the long 
term trend in car traffic compared with the former and current DfT forecasts, and Figure2 
shows more detail on the recent period of car trips and distance travelled. 
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Figure 1. Trend in car traffic since 1950, and DfT 1989 and 2007 forecasts 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Car Trips and Car Distance Travelled, per person, 1975-2009 
 
 
Source: Chained from DfT National Travel Surveys, 2010, 2004 and 2001 
 
Nobody has yet fully explained this shift in trend, but it is obvious that the shift has predated 
the current recession by a considerable period. One very important indicator is ‘transport 
intensity’, which measures the association between traffic growth and economic growth. 
Generally speaking they tend to rise and fall together, to some extent (which does not of itself 
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prove a cause-and-effect relationship) but it is notable that this relationship has changed 
substantially over the last twenty years, as shown in figure 3 (numbered 1.2b in the original). 
 
Figure 3: ‘Decoupling’: A shift in the relationship between traffic and economic growth 
 
 
 
Thus until the early 1990s, economic growth was associated with high and increasing traffic 
growth. Since then, it has been associated with lower and decreasing traffic growth. This is 
indeed what policy would have intended, giving very favourable possibilities of economic 
growth without excessive congestion or environmental damage, and declared policies of both 
Conservative and Labour administrations have sought to achieve this. Indeed it is interesting 
that the time of a policy shift in relation to road building, environmental impacts, and traffic 
growth occurred in the period 1990-1994 (notably associated with Gummer, Portillo and 
Mawhinney) with a consistent development in 1997-8 (notably associated with Prescott),  
though it is not usually thought that their policies could have been powerful enough to result 
in such a marked shift on their own. However, whatever the reason, I would argue that the 
scale of car traffic growth implied by the earlier DfT forecasts, and used by Eddington, is no 
longer plausible. Given that assumed continuation of the earlier trends underpins all the road 
BCR calculations, it is necessary to reconsider this substantially. Whether the future is of 
continuing falls in car use, or a return to some stable or slightly increasing level, there is no 
evidence for such large growth as previously. The effect will unambiguously be to reduce the 
estimated value for money of road schemes compared with the Eddington calculations. . 
 
The problem is how big to make the adjustment, since this would require redoing all the 
modelling and forecasting with new assumptions. However, some indication may be given 
from a different, but related, issue, which in fact had been recalculated for the Eddington 
appendices. This concerns what would happen if there were road pricing at some point in the 
future during the 60 year appraisal period of road schemes. (In this case we are using the road 
pricing results not as part of an argument about road pricing itself, but as the best available 
evidence about what effect a more favourable pattern of traffic would have on the value for 
money of infrastructure spending). 
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This is seen in model results from the Department for Transport annex to the Eddington 
Report, which I have reformatted for comparability, as shown in table 3.  
 
Table 3 Marginal Benefit-Cost Ratios for Road Building With and Without Road 
Pricing, according to the DfT’s National Transport Model 
 
Additional Lane 
Kilometres 
Marginal BCR 
without road 
pricing 
Additional Road 
Kilometres 
Marginal BCR with 
road pricing 
  350-550 1.5 
  550-700 1.5 
  700-850 1.1 
  850-1150 1.0 
  1150-1500 1.1 
1450-2250 3.0 1500-2450 0.9 
2250-2750 2.3  
2450-3700 
 
0.7 2750-3250 1.2 
3250-3350 0.7 
3350-4450 1.0  
3700-4600 
 
0.7 4450-5200 -0.1 
5200-6150 0.2   
 
 
The results show that the incremental benefit of extra road construction declines the more one 
builds, both with and without road pricing. The reduced overall traffic level, and its 
relocation in less congested conditions, resulting from road pricing substantially reduces the 
estimated benefits obtainable from road building: the modelling suggested there would be an 
economic case for building 3250 lane kilometres by 2025 if road pricing is not implemented, 
but only 700 lane kilometres if it is, a reduction in the warranted road programme of nearly 
80%. Comparing like with like, road pricing reduces the BCR of road spending substantially, 
eg by 70% in the roughly overlapping category 1450-2250 lane kilometres in the table (from 
a good BCR of 3 to an unacceptable BCR of 0.9, a reduction of two thirds. The reason for 
this is mainly that the problems of congestion which the road building had been intended to 
solve, would be largely already solved by more rational pricing, so that the extra benefit of 
building the roads is small compared with their cost. 
 
Thus one of the indirect financial consequences of road pricing would be the saving of funds 
on unnecessary road building. (Since it also generates net revenue itself, there is a double 
whammy effect on public finances, a feature which may lead to a re-growth in policy interest 
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by Government in the future. Indeed it may be a triple whammy, since it would also be 
expected to reduce the need for at least some public transport revenue support, because of the 
more buoyant market conditions that would apply, and possibly increase the proportion of 
public transport infrastructure spending that would be profitably funded internally). For the 
time being however I assume that all the policy assessments are made on the assumption of 
not implementing road pricing, which is why the economic impacts can in some cases be 
perverse and unintended.  
 
The mechanisms by which road pricing brings about a reduction in congestion are not the 
same as those by which a reduction in traffic growth for other reasons brings about a 
reduction in congestion, but the orders of magnitude of effect seem prima facie comparable. 
At the moment I assume that the scale of impact on benefits which would be available from 
road pricing is broadly similar to the scale that would be caused by other transport policies 
(eg a combination of smarter choices, public transport improvements, etc, though these would 
certainly be a more expensive way of achieving them), and that the scale of effects that would 
be brought about by spontaneous other changes in trend are capped at the same level, though 
in principle of course they could be greater. Thus the reduction in BCR on road schemes due 
to road pricing is used provisionally as a measure of the effect of other sources of reduced 
traffic growth.  
 
 
(b) Indirect Tax 
In the period 2003 to 2009 the DfT used a rather non-standard method of social cost benefit 
analysis, such that the indirect tax consequences of a project were included as benefits or 
costs. For example, if a road scheme induced traffic which generated more fuel tax revenue, 
the extra revenue was treated as a reduction of the cost of the scheme. This approach became 
increasingly criticised as it appeared to be biased towards roads schemes and against public 
transport and especially against those where traffic reduction was actually intended as a 
policy objective. It appeared to build in an incentive to public stakeholders to adopt policies 
which were in direct conflict with objectives of efficiency and environmental protection. In 
2009 DfT decided (rightly, in my view) that this approach was not going to be continued, and 
from 2010 new schemes are being assessed using a different approach, in which tax effects – 
though clearly of course important in themselves – are not confused with the ratio of benefits 
to costs of the scheme itself.  
The DfT
5
 retrospectively reworked 10 Highways Agency schemes, as shown in Figure 4. 
                                                 
5
 O’Sullivan P and Smith S (2009) So you thought you understood value for money? GES Conference July, DfT  
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A chart illustrating the BCRs for a selection of road schemes
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The now abandoned approach is violet in the figures, labelled ‘NATA’. In 8 of the 10 cases 
the BCR given under the former NATA approach (in violet) is higher than any other 
criterion, and in three of these cases the difference is very substantial indeed,  a BCR of the 
order of 12-15 in cases where the three other methods all give BCRs of the order of 3-5. This 
result is reinforced by work by Buchan (2009), who carried out an analysis of a small number 
of specific schemes, including some whose BCR will be better under the new approach. His 
results
6
 are shown in Table 4, (numbered 1 in the original). 
 
 
The direction and order of magnitude of change for road schemes is broadly consistent with 
the DfT schemes reported above. In some other cases the change is in the opposite direction, 
notably the busway, rail freight scheme, to a lesser extent Merseytram, and very substantially 
for the Cycle scheme where an already very large BCR (calculated by the DfT) is made 
                                                 
6
 Keith Buchan, cited in Cary R, Phillips R and Harwood J (2009) The right route: improving transport decision-
making, Green Alliance, November. http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/grea_p.aspx?id=4619 
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substantially greater. This is entirely in accordance with what one would expect. The biggest 
class of schemes affected are those whose indirect effect is to increase tax revenue, primarily 
by inducing more traffic. These are mainly the bigger road schemes. The new rules will 
reduce their BCRs, compared with the 2003-2009 rules which produced the data used by 
Eddington.  
 
Other schemes which would be affected in the opposite direction are those whose indirect 
effect is to reduce tax revenue, primarily by reducing traffic, but potentially also by 
increasing fuel efficiency. This would include smarter choices, cycling and public transport 
improvements. The new rules would increase their BCRs compared with the 2003-2009 
rules.   
 
An adjustment to take account of tax changes can be made unambiguously in the case of most 
road schemes, since nearly all the available BCR results in recent years will have been made 
according to the now abandoned method. By inspection of the DfT and Buchan results, a 
cautious adjustment would be to reduce the BCRs of the apparently best-performing schemes 
by half, the next best by 20% and the next tranche by 5%. However, without inspecting the 
detailed studies individually it is not clear how much to increase the results for the opposite 
effect, since some of them ignored the DfT recommended procedure during this period (eg 
smarter choices), and others require a more detailed study to assess on a case by case basis 
(especially public transport improvements). Therefore the results are not formally amended, 
though this is likely to result in some degree of underestimate of the benefits of the latter, 
especially where the studies were done by DfT, or according to its recommendations.  
 
3. What type of transport spending should be prioritised, in the context of an 
overall spending reduction, in order best to support regional and national 
economic growth? 
First, two caveats.  
1. There is an argument about whether the contribution of transport to economic growth 
is additional to the economic value of effects measured in cost-benefit studies, or 
simply a re-expression of the same benefits. Eddington was mainly concerned with 
circumstances where an additional impact may be taken as additional benefit. The 
preceding SACTRA
7
 study, 1999, had given more attention to the nature of the 
conditions for this ‘additionality’, and as a result argued that in cases where certain 
types of market imperfection exist (especially where transport decisions cause 
economic costs which are not charged for, and sometimes where transport-using firms 
are themselves subsidised or inefficient), the additional economic effects of transport 
improvements can be bad for the economy not good, by encouraging a greater volume 
of traffic which does not pay its way. But in any case, it is probably agreed that there 
will not be wider economic improvements unless there are narrower transport 
improvements (speed, reliability, cost, etc) to start with. Having good value for money 
in transport terms is a necessary (bit not sufficient) condition for good value for 
                                                 
7
 SACTRA (1999) Transport and the Economy, Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Appraisal, 
Department for Transport, London.  
Transport and the Economy: Transport Committee Inquiry                                    Phil Goodwin September 2010 
11 
 
money in terms of economic impact. Therefore distinguishing between ‘transport 
getting better’ and ‘slowing down the pace at which transport gets worse’ is crucial. 
2. Concerning regional effects, it must be remembered that transport impacts are 
geographically specific and do not necessarily benefit the intended area. Thus benefits 
known as ‘agglomeration’ mostly relate to for high income areas of intense economic 
activity such as town centres, whereas benefits known as ‘regeneration’ are mostly 
intended for areas of low incomes, perhaps unemployment, and less intense activity. 
Intended improvements can sometimes make things worse for these areas, due to the 
well known ‘two-way road’ problem, which is usually tactfully not mentioned. (See 
Appendix). 
Having made these caveats, it is logical to start discussion of value for money by 
consideration of benefit cost ratios, as Eddington did. The Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of a 
project is an estimate of its value made by comparing its real resource costs with a wide range 
of economically-valued benefits including effects on some or all of congestion, accidents, 
carbon, health, local environment, travel time, consumer satisfaction and wider effects on the 
economy which might be generated by these benefits. It is not a perfect measure, not coping 
well with strategic interactions of policies and projects or considerations of fairness and 
political acceptability, and in practice very many assumptions are built in which can have the 
effect of giving answers which are biased for or against certain types of projects.  
The approach I use is similar in underpinning to Eddington’s, but with a somewhat different 
presentation. It is based on the idea that for each area of expenditure (road building, public 
transport improvements, smarter choices, etc) the benefits of properly judged spending 
increase as spending increases, but usually at a declining rate, so that that the best projects at 
the top of the list will have a bigger benefit and higher value for money than the marginal 
projects at the bottom of the list. This can be depicted as in figure 5, for the expenditure 
classes A, B, C etc.  
Figure 5. Incremental benefits from successive increases in spending 
 
It follows generally that the more is spent on a particular area, the lower the benefits. 
Although there is no presumption that decisions already made in the past will have been 
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optimised, in general it is likely that the more mature the field of application, the more of the 
very best projects will already have been identified and carried out, so a mature class of 
expenditure may well have lower BCRs than it used to have, and lower also than new 
emerging fields. This does not mean that the new is always better than the old, but does mean 
that it is more likely to have unexplored potential. 
Results  
Table 5 and Figure 6 show the results
8
. 
Table 5: BCRs by Quartile of Expenditure in Nine Areas of Spending  
Conc
Bus 
Fares
0.125 50
0.2 30 20
0.25 30 6
0.375 20
0.4 15 10
0.5 10 6 10 1.3
0.6 10 5
0.625 0
0.75 6
0.8 6 4
1 0 0 12 4 1.1
1.25 7
1.5 3 0.6
2 1.5 0.5
2.5 0 0 4 1.5 6
3.75 2
5 1.5 1.25 3
6.25 0
7.5 0.7 1.5
10 0.6 1.2
12.5 0 0
New 
Light 
Rail
HA 
Roads
RailExp £b Local 
Safety 
Smarter 
Choices
Cycling Local 
Bus 
Local 
Roads
(Res
ults after adjustment for traffic growth, indirect tax, and omitted elements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 A longer report gives technical details of assumptions, sources and methods. I have provided a copy to the 
Committee Transport Specialist, and it may also be obtained by emailing me at philinelh@yahoo.com  
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Figure 6 Value for Money Related to Expenditure  
 
 
 A strong pattern is now emerging of which types of transport expenditure have the greatest 
value for money in terms of speeds, travel times, safety, and other economic costs such as 
health. In summary, by far the best returns come from smarter choices, local safety schemes, 
cycling schemes, and the best of local bus and some rail quality and reliability enhancements, 
together with new light rail systems in some places. Traditional road capacity schemes are 
now giving much lower estimated value for money than cited in Eddington, due (a) to a 
change (for the better) in the way that taxation is accounted for in the studies, and (b) the 
effects of lower traffic growth, whether due to road pricing, other policies, or to changing 
trends.  
 
In current circumstances, it turns out that by far the best value for money is being gained 
from Group 1, consisting of low budget items, namely local safety schemes, smarter choices, 
and cycling schemes. The next in order of value for money is Group 2, including some cheap 
and some more expensive public transport improvements, namely the best local bus schemes, 
and the best new light rail and conventional rail schemes.  
However, Group 3, consisting mainly of Highways Agency and Local Roads schemes, gives 
much poorer results (even for the best schemes) after allowing for the new approach to 
indirect tax, and if allowance is made for the damping effect on traffic growth either of road 
pricing, or of some combination of other policies with the same impact, or on changes in 
traffic trends due to other reasons.  
Therefore the best overall value for money will be gained from increasing the expenditure on 
the first group, protecting the best projects in the second group, and making savings mostly 
from the worst projects in Group 2, and all except the very best in Group 3. 
Although carbon considerations have played only a very small part in the calculations, the 
resulting pattern of recommended expenditures is very supportive of carbon objectives.  
BCR 
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Road pricing is not itself included in the analysis: since it produces both revenue and net 
social benefit, it will inevitably count better as ‘value for money’ than any of the spending 
policies included. However, it is allowed for in testing the robustness of other policies: road 
pricing would (like reduced traffic growth for other reasons) reduce the value for money of 
road building. It could also increase the ability for public transport to fund its own 
improvements.  
Concessionary fares spending similarly is not quite comparable, but it does seem to produce a 
good level of social and economic benefits.    
Road maintenance, pedestrianisation of town centres, traffic calming (other than safety 
schemes) and traffic management are not yet included in the analysis. I believe it would be 
very worthwhile to do so. 
The results are provisional, to test the feasibility of the method, availability of data, and 
robustness of the conclusions. Qualitatively they seem in line with common sense and 
strategic priorities, but the exact numbers would be influenced by detailed data which could 
be published by the DfT, and further more substantial analysis and remodelling.  
It is interesting to note that a recent report by the industry lobby group London First
9
 
suggested that the wider economic benefit was the highest proportion of total benefit for 
urban public transport schemes, with interurban road schemes having a very much smaller 
effect.  
How should the balance between capital and revenue be altered? 
The main problem is an artificially strict imposition of the distinction between capital and 
revenue spending especially in the case where well-judged revenue spending (such as on 
smarter choices) actually makes it possible to make larger savings in capital. In these cases, it 
is sometimes necessary to forego thesaving, making less efficient use of funds, because of the 
implicitly ‘higher’ importance of capital. The problem would be solved by suitably ingenious 
redefinition, giving local authorities some flexibility, which they would like and which would 
give better value for money.  
Many of the best expenditures traditionally are classed as ‘revenue’ expenditure rather than 
‘capital’. To get maximum benefit it is essential to have some form of interchangeability or 
trade-off such that (for example) revenue spending which saves a greater amount of capital 
spending can be counted under the rules for capital expenditure. Otherwise there is a serious 
danger that the best value projects will be wiped out while inferior spending is protected.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 London First (2010) Greater Returns Transport Priorities for Economic Growth, London, June. The report also 
suggested that the wider economic benefit from transport spending in London was a greater proportion of total 
benefit than in other places.  
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Appendix. The ‘Two-Way Road’ Problem 
 
 
 
Suppose road improvements are used with the intention of improving the balance of 
international trade (usually called ‘to help exports’) or to increase the economic efficiency of 
an area (usually discussed in terms of ‘attracting inward investment’), or giving access to jobs 
over a wider area. The problem is that such projects may instead have the opposite effect, ie 
increasing imports rather than exports, or encvouraging outward investment, or giving 
improved job opportunities to people outside the area, etc. The SACTRA report ‘Transport 
and the Economy’ emphased the importance of considering such unintended effects as well 
as the intended ones, and formal advice from the DfT reminds scheme promoters that they 
need to include such effects in their analyses, but in practice it is virtually never done. All the 
effects are assumed either to be positive, or negligable, never negative. (Hence the use of 
phrases like ‘wider economic benefits’ rather than ‘wider economic impacts).   
 
The classic case is as follows. Consider a long but rather simple country, with uniform 
density, which has a single rather poor quality road, running East-West. There is a single 
distribution company, considering where to locate. It may be proved (and is intuitively rather 
obvious) that the best place for it to locate is at the half-way point. Here it will get maximum 
access to the whole country with minimum transport costs. Now this half way point happens 
to be the boundary between two regions, who are competing for tax revenue, employment 
opportunities and the signs of economic progress.  They are controlled by different political 
parties, and the party in the East decides to make a substantial improvement in its half of the 
road, straightening and widening it, to enable faster travel. This is intended to attract the 
distribution company over the border into its region. The adminsitration in the West does 
nothing. 
 
The directors of the company are in fact wondering about relocating because their lease is up 
for renewal. They now consider – with the new transport arrangements, where is the best 
place for them to locate? Should they move? And if they do, in which direction? 
(As a student essay, I usually leave this question open, and it is offered to Committee 
members as an interesting thought exercise). 
 
 
